INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC SEAFOOD INDUSTRY

International Relations/Trade,

Did Processing Quota Damage Alaska Red King Crab Harvesters? Empirical Evidence

The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) red king crab fisheries are managed with a controversial, market-based policy design, in which both individual transferable fishing and processing quotas are used. Despite the fact that the policy design maintains contestable markets, concern remains that the use of individual transferable processing quota (IPQ) damages harvesters who receive individual transferable fishing quota (IFQ). An integer, nonlinear optimization model that incorporates an empirically estimated, non-linear catch per unit effort function is developed to measure imputed IFQ values. The imputed quota values are based solely on harvesting efficiency in the absence of IPQs or potential wealth redistribution between sectors. Results are compared to a prerationalization optimization model and also to empirical quota trading prices in the presence of IPQs. This with and without analysis lends insight into whether and/or the extent to which IPQs damaged BSAI crab harvesters.Crab rationalization, IPQ, IFQ, imputed quota prices, harvesting efficiency., Environmental Economics and Policy, Public Economics, Q22, Q28, D61, C61, L78.,

Toward the Integration of Economics and Outdoor Recreation Management

The general theme of this bulletin is that improved management of public-sector recreational resources is a multidisciplinary task. To this end, we attempt to integrate elements of outdoor recreation management theory and economics. The bulletin is written for both resource managers and researchers. For the former, our intent is to emphasize the importance of being aware of economic implications-at least conceptually-of management actions that influence the character and availability of recreational opportunities. To researchers involved in developing recreation management theory, we draw attention to the parallel between recreation management theory and the traditional managerial economic model of the firm. To economists, particularly those involved in developing and applying nonmarket valuation techniques, we draw attention to the types of decisions faced by resource managers. We argue that the most important resource allocation issues are of the incremental variety, so nonmarket valuation should also yield incremental values. These values alone, however, are not sufficient economic input into rational public choice analysis. The missing link , or nexus, between outdoor recreation management theory and economic analysis is the integration of supply and demand, as called for by traditional managerial economics. Collaborative research to develop recreation supply response functions akin to agricultural production functions is an essential step that is missing from both literatures. Theoretical and applied work assume greater practical importance if they feed information into this broadened framework. It is our hope that this bulletin will bring the disciplines closer to that realization

Performance of traditional cooperatives: the Portuguese Douro wine cooperatives

Globalization is challenging the very core of cooperative governance and ownership decision, especially in Southern European countries, like Portugal, where a large number of producers are organized in traditional and Mediterranean-style agricultural cooperatives. This paper analyses the effects of governance and control variables related with size over two alternative indicators of performance: revenues transferred to members/patrons and capital structure. The results suggest that these cooperatives have difficulties being sustainable in the more competitive global wine markets, if they follow, essentially, a practice of maximum patronage refund, reducing their capacity to improve leverage and to finance more profitable, but risky, long run investments.Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Q13, D22, L25,

Manager Power, Member Behavior and Capital Structure: Portuguese Douro Wine Cooperatives

Leverage is one of the most important financial factors to the survival and viability of agricultural cooperatives (e.g., wine cooperatives) during a period of intense competition. Leverage is influenced both by the behavior of managers and cooperative members. An empirical study for the Douro Demarcated Region Wine Cooperatives (DDRWC) supports the hypothesis that managers have a positive influence in the determination of the equity/total assets ratio and that individualistic behavior of cooperative members has a negative influence in the value of this ratio. This paper suggests that there may be value in reconsidering cooperatives in the context of a so-called Mediterranean model.Agribusiness, Agricultural cooperatives, governance, behavior and leverage,

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF LIVESTOCK WASTE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF LARGE-SCALE DAIRYING

The analytical approach to studying waste management is investigated here in the context of large scale dairying. The typical short-run approach that regards waste management as separable from primary production is contrasted with a longer-run systems approach in which waste management is regarded as an interdependent stage of production. Failure to consider interdependencies between waste management and agricultural production could compromise potential efficiencies in the overall system. Furthermore, cooperative waste treatment and disposal among livestock producers may contribute to greater efficiency and afford opportunities for resource conservation and recovery through waste utilization.Environmental Economics and Policy, Livestock Production/Industries,

Policy Formulation Versus Policy Implementation Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Insight from the North Pacific Crab Rationalization

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) governs management of fisheries located three to 200 miles off the coast of the United States. The MSA is unique in administrative law in that it devolves policy formulation to eight Regional Fishery Management Councils rather than to a federal agency. That agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), is relegated primarily to developing regulations that implement the councils’ policies. NMFS can review the councils’ policies only to ensure that they are consistent with existing laws. NMFS has no authority to revise policy to suit its own preferences, or to write regulations that undercut council policy intent, except when conflicts with other applicable laws arise. The MSA’s legislative history reveals NMFS routinely undercuts this special administrative process through the regulations it writes. We review a recent example in which NMFS attempted to undermine the North Pacific Fishery Management Council’s crab rationalization policy through the regulation-writing process. We offer a simple solution to help avoid future abuse of administrative authority. This solution may have utility in other areas of administrative law in which authority to formulate policy is separated from the power to implement it

Performance de las cooperativas tradicionales: las cooperativas portuguesas de Viño del Duero

[EN] Globalization is challenging the very core of cooperative governance and ownership decision, especially in Southern European countries, like Portugal, where a large number of producers are organized in traditional and Mediterranean-style agricultural cooperatives. This paper analyses the effects of governance and control variables related with size over two alternative indicators of performance: revenues transferred to members/patrons and capital structure. The results suggest that these cooperatives have difficulties being sustainable in the more competitive global wine markets, if they follow, essentially, a practice of maximum patronage refund, reducing their capacity to improve leverage and to finance more profitable, but risky, long run investments.[ES] La globalización está poniendo en cuestión la esencia de la gobernanza cooperativa y su estructura societaria, sobre todo en los países del Sur de Europa, como Portugal, donde muchos productores están organizados en cooperativas agrícolas tradicionales y de estilo mediterráneo. Este trabajo analiza los efectos de las variables de gobierno y control relacionados con el tamaño sobre dos indicadores de comportamiento alternativos: los ingresos transferidos a los miembros/socios y la estructura del capital. Los resultados sugieren que estas cooperativas atraviesan dificultades para mantenerse sostenibles en un mercado de vino global y más competitivo si siguen, en esencia, una política de máximo retorno al socio, reduciendo su capacidad para de mejorar la estructura de su deuda y capacidad para financiar inversiones más rentables, aunque con mayor riesgo, a largo plazo.Rebelo, J.; Caldas, J.; Matulich, SC. (2011). Performance of traditional cooperatives: the portuguese Douro wine cooperatives. Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales - Agricultural and Resource Economics. 10(2):143-158. https://doi.org/10.7201/earn.2010.02.07SWORD14315810

An Efficient and Distributionally Neutral IFQ Design

A two-stage, distributionally neutral and efficient rationalization policy design—one that preserves the ex ante wealth distribution—is developed by blending elements of a cooperative and a partnership. It is formally proven that there is no impediment to win-win rationalization using only IFQs allocated only to harvesters. The design creates a bilateral monopoly by allocating ITQs only to harvesters who, in Stage 1, join a “dissolution fishery association” (DFA) with the processor(s) through which their landed catch history arose. IFQ is allocated pursuant to a private contract that stipulates dissolution terms, much like a prenuptial. Harvesters that do not join a DFA with their traditional processor(s) must remain in open access. Bilateral negotiations focus on partitioning the total quasi rents of the DFA between a single processor and its traditional harvesters. The negotiated rent share split defines the terms of dissolution, i.e., the share of IFQs that must be left with the processor, if either party leaves the DFA for a preferred opportunity. The rent share split also defines a formula price contract for a functioning DFA. Stage 2 involves consolidation and realignment to maximize overall efficiency. Requirements of Stage 2 are stipulated

Policy-induced Market Failure Under the American Fisheries Act

This paper explores the political economy of using fishery cooperatives to advance voluntary decapitalization and rationalization that the U. S. Congress intended to benefit both vessels and processors. Game theory offers insights into the likelihood of achieving congressional intent. It is argued that the American Fisheries Act introduces a potential new market failure while attempting to rid the fishery of the open access externality.Key words: voluntary fishery cooperatives, rationalization, non-cooperative game, market failur